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Bootleggers and Baptists is a catch-phrase invented by regulatory economist Bruce Yandle〔Bruce Yandle, "Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist." ''Regulation 7'', no. 3 (1983): 12.〕 for the observation that regulations are supported by both groups that want the ostensible purpose of the regulation and groups that profit from undermining that purpose.〔McChesney, Fred S. 1997. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, U.K.: Harvard University Press.〕 For much of the 20th century, Baptists and other evangelical Christians were prominent in political activism for Sunday closing laws restricting the sale of alcohol. Bootleggers sold alcohol illegally, and got more business if legal sales were restricted.〔 “Such a coalition makes it easier for politicians to favor both groups. … ()he Baptists lower the costs of favor-seeking for the bootleggers, because politicians can pose as being motivated purely by the public interest even while they promote the interests of well-funded businesses. … () take the moral high ground, while the bootleggers persuade the politicians quietly, behind closed doors.” ==Economic theory== The mainstream economic theory of regulation treats politicians and administrators as brokers among interest groups.〔Baldwin, Robert, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, “The Oxford Handbook of Regulation”, Oxford University Press, 2012, 978-0199655885.〕〔Lasswell, Harold. () 1990. Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How? New York: McGraw-Hill.〕 Bootleggers and Baptists is a specific idea in the subfield of regulatory economics that attempts to predict which interest groups will succeed in obtaining rules they favor. It holds that coalitions of opposing interests that can agree on a common rule will be more successful than one-sided groups.〔Kahn, Alfred E., “The Economics of Regulation”, The MIT Press, 1988, 978-0262610523.〕 Baptists do not merely agitate for legislation, they help monitor and enforce it (a law against Sunday alcohol sales without significant public support would likely be ignored, or be evaded through bribery of enforcement officers). Thus bootleggers and Baptists is not just an academic restatement of the common political accusation that shadowy for-profit interests are hiding behind public-interest groups to fund deceptive legislation. It is a rational theory〔Bryner, Gary C. 1987. Bureaucratic Discretion: Law and Policy in Federal Regulatory Agencies. New York: Pergamon Press.〕 to explain relative success among types of coalitions.〔〔Tullock, Gordon. 1980. Rent Seeking as a Negative Sum Game. In Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, edited by James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, 16–38. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.〕〔Wagner, Richard E. 1966. Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article. Review of The Logic of Collective Action, by Mancur Olson. Papers on Non-market Decision Making 1: 161–70.〕 Another part of the theory is that bootleggers and Baptists produce suboptimal legislation.〔Buchanan, James M. 1980. Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking. In Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, edited by James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, 3–15. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.〕 Although both groups are satisfied with the outcome, broader society would be better off either with no legislation or different legislation.〔Sutter, Daniel. 2002. "The Democratic Efficiency Debate and Definitions of Political Equilibrium". ''Review of Austrian Economics'' 15, 2/3: 199–209.〕 For example, a surtax on Sunday alcohol sales could reduce Sunday alcohol consumption as much as making it illegal. Instead of enriching bootleggers and imposing policing costs, the surtax could raise money to be spent on, say, property tax exemptions for churches and alcoholism treatment programs. Moreover, such a program could be balanced to reflect the religious beliefs and drinking habits of everyone, not just certain groups. But the surtax is less help to the bootleggers, and not only does not accomplish the main objective of the Baptists, it actually puts the government in league with Satan. From the religious point of the view, the bootleggers have not been cut out of the deal, the government has become the bootlegger.〔 Although the bootleggers and Baptists story has become a standard idea in regulatory economics,〔Schneider, Mark, and Paul Teske. 1992. Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government. American Political Science Review 86, no. 3: 737–47.〕 it has not been systematically validated as an empirical proposition. It is a catch-phrase useful in analyzing regulatory coalitions rather than an accepted principle of economics.〔Breyer, Stephen, “Regulation and Its Reform”, Harvard University Press, 1984, 978-0674753761.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Bootleggers and Baptists」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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